, Florida (2002) and Welzel (2013) 
Introduction Putnam (1995) , Florida (2002), and Welzel (2013) have at least one argument in common: social capital, in the way we knew it, is dying. Still, Already two decades ago, Putnam (1995) based his assumption of the decline of social capital on, among other variables, the behavior of Americans when bowling. As he points out, "between 1980 and 1993 the total number of bowlers in America increased by 10 percent, while league bowling decreased by 40 percent" (PUTNAM, 1995, p.70) . He also argued that different forms of civil engagement might have increased, for instance, participation at the Association of Retired Persons. Still, it took place in a different way, as "for the vast majority of their members, the only act of membership consists in writing a check for dues or perhaps occasionally reading a newsletter" (PUT-NAM, 1995, p.71) , instead of attending meetings and interacting with other members.
Seven years later, Florida (2002) argued that the old form of social capital, related to strong community bonds, was giving place to a new form of interaction: the creative capital. And it was rather positive once people, as he argued, "wanted community, but not to the extent that they were inhibited from living their own life and being themselves" (FLORIDA, 2002, p.269) . In this sense, people were looking for "diversity, low entry barriers and the ability to be themselves" (FLORIDA, 2002, p.269 ). This desire gave birth to the creative capital and a creative class, characterized by weak ties that produced social interaction with a greater number of people without the bonds generated by Putnam's strong-tie relationships. According to Florida (2002, p.275) , these characteristics would be found in the creative centers of large urban cities, which "have high levels of innovation and high-tech industry and very high levels of diversity, but lower than average levels of social capital and moderate levels of political involvement".
Whereas Welzel (2013) is also optimistic about this trend, he does not think that creating a new term is necessary. As he argues, when pro-civic individualism dominates, the nature of social capital transforms. Indeed, I argue that pro-civic individualism brings a sea change from a dominance of imposed affiliations that chain us to prefixed groups toward chosen affiliations in which we are free to connect and disconnect as we like. Hence, individualization does not erode social capital; it transforms the nature of social capital, changing it from a captivating into a liberating property (WELZEL, 2013, p.192). His data is solid in showing that regions and people with strong emancipative values, the basis for pro-civic individualism, are marked by an unselfish, trustful and humanistic behavior. Therefore, lone-bowlers, instead of being unsocial people, are more prone to create an equal and tolerant society.
One might be optimistic or pessimistic about it, but it is difficult to deny the trend presented by these three authors where the old form of social capital seems to be dying and being replaced by a different mode of interaction, marked by weak-tie relationships and benign individualism. On the other hand, some questions arise from this trend, for instance on the policy implications of this change and, as I will focus in the following sections, on how sustainable this trend is. 
Clarifying concepts
Before moving ahead in the proposed discussion, I must explain the selected concepts and the context they are inserted in. I do so by presenting the post-materialist argument, in a certain way derived from the modernization theory, and the subsequent concepts of social capital, creative capital (and class), and emancipative values. Finally, as to prepare the basis for the following chapter, I discuss alternative meanings of populism.
Modernization theory and post-materialism
Corroborating to the central claim of modernization theory, Inglehart (1997, p.5) 
Social capital
The idea of social capital derives from modernization theory, as Putnam (1994) merges socioeconomic modernity and "patterns of civic involvement and social solidarity" to explain the higher levels of development in Northern Italy when compared to southern region of the same country (PUTNAM, 1994, p.83) . In other words, there is a causal link between modernization and civic-ness, namely social capital, also explained as the "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (PUTNAM, 1994, p.167) . In this sense, social capital becomes a triggering factor of development while, as a moral resource, being triggered by development.
Creative capital
Creative capital refers to a specific type of hu- and obedience as a non-desired quality.
Populism
There are several ways of conceptualizing populism. Coniff (1999) populism is defined here as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté généra-le (general will) of the people (MUDDE; KALTWASSER, 2012, p.8).
The selected definition encompasses Coniff's (1999) populist-mass linkages while expanding Kaufman and Stallings's (1991) Focusing on collectivism, two statements were mentioned to the interviewees who should state how much it sounded alike to their own thoughts. The statements were: "it is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong" (conformity), and "living in secure surrounding is important to this person, to avoid anything that might be dangerous" (security) (WELZEL, 2013, p.196) .
The rejection of these elements represents an approximation to the emancipative values which, in this sense, is like Florida's (2002) creative class.
Going specifically against the notion of conformity, Florida (2002, p.269) Another feature mapped by Welzel (2013) when perceiving the nature of individualism was the distinction between selfish and unselfish behavior. Therefore, it makes sense to believe that the opposite groups to the ones analyzed by Florida On the other hand, as previously mentioned, at the individual level it was possible to predict that citizens with anti-immigrant and anti-refugee attitudes were more prone to vote for such parties. Another contributing factor to the far-right rise might also lie in the argument that the creative class, in some cases composed by migrants, has its political engagement restrained by some factors, as highlighted by Florida (2002) .
For instance, many ethnically diverse communities are full of people working hard to gain a foothold in a new country, which leaves them little free time for civic affairs. Language or cultural barriers may further limit their ability to participate. They are also more likely to be excluded from or perceive that they are excluded from traditional avenues of political and civic participation. Perhaps many of them do not even hold U.S. citizenship or permanent resident status (FLO-RIDA, 2002, p.271 ).
Welzel (2013) 
Methodological gaps and omissions
Additional gaps and omissions might mislead decision-makers when transforming the findings of Florida (2002) and Welzel (2013) into public policies, especially when related to aspects that might generate clashes with the unorganized far-right. In this section I focus exclusively on methodological aspects, counting on insights from the existing literature.
First of all, I present the interesting debate between Florida (2002) and Glaeser (2004) . The latter argued that, whereas there was merit in Florida's effort into merging creativity to the rise of bohemian lifestyles, his correlation between the creative class and city growth was not accurate. On the contrary, positive results were found because of the highly-educated profile of a great parcel of the creative class, implying that growth did not result from high diversity but from skilled professionals. According to Glaeser (2004, p.2) , this difference would drastically change policy prescriptions: instead of "funky, socially free areas with cool downtowns and lots of density", these individuals desired "big suburban lots with easy commutes by automobile and safe streets and good schools and low taxes". at exceptional strength and in meaningful ways with several dozen key indicators of (1) socioeconomic development, (2) cultural legacies, and (3) institutional performance (...). The correspondence of the value constructs with these aspects of social reality ranges from 60% to 80%, across almost 100 countries representing more than 90% of the world population (WELZEL; INGLEHART, 2016 INGLEHART, , p.1075 ).
Alternatives and negative implications
Still, how these criticisms, be them valid or not, could evidence a gap in the constructs of Florida (2002) and Welzel (2013) 
